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Faking It. For Real 
This is an attempt to tackle the question of the force of movies. To do so, I will make use 
of a very sideways approach, neither coming from the movies nor from film theory or 
film philosophy, but from a philosophical argument that has nothing to do with movies, 
an argument made by Immanuel Kant. In his Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of 
View Kant makes a series of surprising claims, surprising at least with regard to the 
image of Kant as moral rigorist. These claims present an instructive entry point for my 
following remarks. In paragraph 13 of the Anthropology, which is entitled “On artificial 
play with sensory illusion” Kant introduces a distinction into the realm of what he calls 
“delusion” (2007: 261).1 Delusion is produced in the understanding as an effect of sense-
representation. The conceptual refinement Kant now introduces is that delusion is 
either illusion and then it is natural or it is deception and then it is artificial. And he 
adds: “illusion is delusion that persists even though one knows that the supposed 
subject is not real” (2007: 261). Think of perceptive illusion which persists even though 
one knows how things really are. Or think of Spinoza’s example that even though we 
know, if we know a bit of physics, that the sun is not a tiny-shiny potato up in the sky, 
when we leave the house it is precisely as such a potato that it spontaneously appears to 
us. Kant himself later uses clothing as an example for this effect, clothing “whose color 
sets off the face to advantage” (2007: 262). In opposition to illusion that persists and 
seems therefore independent from knowledge, deception stops as soon as one attains 
knowledge about how the object of deception is constituted. Kant’s example here is 
makeup, which for him is not seductive like clothing, but rather gives one the feeling that 
one is “mocked […]. This is why the statues of human beings and animals painted with 
natural colors are not liked: each time they unexpectedly come into sight, one is 
momentarily deceived into regarding them as living” (2007: 262; original emphasis). 
 Illusion is what persists even when one identifies illusion as illusion – deception 
does not survive its identification. Deception is therefore always accompanied by the 
                                                        
1 Slavoj Žižek (2014) has commented on these passages. 
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impression of being mocked: something appears in my sight, which then turns out to be 
different from how I first perceived it to be. Knowledge thereby corrects a 
misperception that was artificially constructed. In illusion it is not knowledge and 
perception, but knowledge and belief that are somehow constitutively separated – one 
can know that something is an illusion, yet one does nonetheless not believe what one 
knows. This is, obviously, the famous formula of fetishist disavowal, pointedly coined by 
Octave Mannoni: ‘I know very well, but nevertheless…’. Deception does not follow the 
same structure: if you know that you have been deceived, you will immediately believe 
what you know. This means that for Kant illusions have an efficacy and endurance that 
exceeds that of deception. Their power is linked to, even derived from the splitting of 
knowledge and belief. 
 This is the diagnosis on the basis of which Kant draws some daring conclusions. The 
next paragraph of his Anthropology is entitled “On permissible moral illusion.” Therein 
he states: 
On the whole, the more civilized human beings are, the more they are actors. They 
adopt the illusion of affection, of respect for others, of modesty[…] without 
deceiving anyone at all, because it is understood by everyone that nothing is meant 
sincerely by this. And it is also good that this happens in the world. For when 
human beings play these roles, eventually the virtues, whose illusion they have 
merely affected for a considerable length of time, will gradually really be aroused 
and merge into the disposition. But to deceive the deceiver in ourselves, the 
inclinations, is a return to obedience under the law of virtue and is not a deception, 
but rather a laudable illusion [Täuschung] of ourselves. (2007: 263f.) 
 Kant here depicts a peculiar kind of performativity at work, which is also the reason 
why we are here dealing with an anthropology from a pragmatic point of view. The 
performativity is peculiar because implies a surprising kind of causality, one that almost 
resembles the Hegelian conception of the negation of negation. This causality is 
embedded, if not embodied, in polite ways of faking it; in illusionary ways of acting as if 
one were nice, charming, modest, tolerant, etc. Although these are just illusionary 
practices and although everyone knows this, they are nonetheless effective. Yet, their 
effectiveness does not derive from an act of deceiving others, but from deceiving the 
deceiver in ourselves: the inclinations, which otherwise move us away from acting in a 
virtuous, modest, etc. manner. 
 This is to say that pretending to be a nice person does not mean to deceive others. It 
rather implies that I generate an illusion whose effect is that I deceive the deceiver in 
myself. The effect of this is that my actions start to correspond to the illusion, whereby I 
effectively become the illusion that I have generated in my relations to others. The 
structure of this is the following: I know I am faking it, the others know that I am faking 
it and they are faking it, too. Yet, through the interplay of pretence and illusions, I start 
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to believe in the very illusion enacted, and I become what I pretended to be. Therefore, 
Kant claims in the same paragraph that “this is precisely why they [the illusions] do not 
deceive, because everyone knows how they should be taken, and especially because 
these signs of benevolence and respect, though empty at first, gradually lead to real 
dispositions of this sort” (2007: 264; original emphasis). Through (and maybe only 
through) empty illusions one can generate something real, a real disposition for example 
of a virtuous kind. The emptiness of the illusions – empty because they are not linked to 
true subjective commitments – functions thereby like a placeholder for virtue-to-
emerge. This is also why even “the illusion of good in others must have worth for us, for 
out of this play of pretences [Verstellungen], which acquires respect without perhaps 
earning it, something quite serious can finally develop” (2007: 264). It is “only the 
illusion of good in ourselves that must be wiped out without exemption” (2007: 264). 
Otherwise I, for example, have the illusion that I am a good guy and I blame the objective 
circumstances for not allowing me to be that good guy. Kant’s own example is that at the 
end of one’s life someone regrets all of her wrongdoings and assumes that this is already 
an index for a change of character. As soon as I generate such a self-illusion, it ultimately 
proves to be nothing but a deception – self-illusion is thus fundamentally different from 
pretence. Since for such self-illusion holds that if I had the knowledge of how I really am, 
I would immediately see myself as being the (say bad) person that I am. Self-illusion is 
individual misperception and hence deception. 
 Real politeness and virtue emerge from pretence and illusions. It is linked to the 
force, to the power of illusion as such. Even if I and all others know that I am faking it, it 
is possible that through faking it I start to believe in what I faked. The structure of this 
can be summed up as follows: “I know very well I am pretending X, but nevertheless I 
start to believe in what I am pretending and hence actually become the illusion that I 
enacted.” The astonishing point is that Kant here neither argues for a grounding of real 
ethical disposition in a transcendental a priori normative framework which could orient 
subjective-practical action, nor does he ground the transcendental normative 
framework in its empirical human embodiment (this would have been what Foucault 
(2008) in his comments on the Anthropology called the empirical-transcendental 
double). Rather, the truly ethical dispositions are grounded in a belief, in a fully 
transparent illusion, which springs from a collective practice. They are grounded in an 
illusion which we know to be an illusion, but we nonetheless believe in it. Such an 
illusion is for Kant the true performative groundwork for something real to emerge. 
Here one can specify the precise character of the relation between the two stages of 
pretending and becoming one’s pretence that Kant delineates: as long as one pretends 
one knows that one pretends and hence one does not really believe in what one is 
pretending, otherwise pretending would not be pretending any longer. There is hence a 
separation between knowledge and belief, informed by knowledge.  
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 When one starts believing what one is pretending, one does not know that one is not 
pretending anymore – a split between belief and knowledge emerges. In that moment, 
one believes in something, but one does not know what one is doing – simply already 
because one does not know that one believes something that differs from what one 
(believes to) know(s). First one knows what one does but does not believe in it (this is 
why one is faking and pretending), then one starts believing in what one just pretends 
and this belief does something to what we know of our own action. This is to say that I 
am neither simply pretending nor was I simply overwhelmed by the illusion which I 
previously enacted. Rather something in me, this is Kant’s point, has started believing 
without me knowing what I am doing: I do not know that I believe in what I just pretend 
to do, but I believe to know that I am just pretending.  My knowledge and my belief go 
separate, yet entangled ways. The subject of this pretending practice is split between 
pretension and its effects, between acting in a believable way and being what is enacted, 
between not knowing what one believes and believing one knows. Yet, the moment the 
pretension becomes real is impossible to determine and the subject will only post facto 
be able to register that this move has occurred. 
 This is to say that knowledge and belief are somehow internally separated in the 
sense that knowledge itself cannot coincide with itself. In the Anthropology, pretence is 
thus for Kant a necessary precondition of a real virtuous disposition, which emerges 
without our knowledge. First one knows that one is pretending, afterwards one believes 
what one was pretending, but one does not know that one believes what one knew to be 
fake before. So, technically one is dealing with a sort of unconscious belief. There is a 
strange application of this Kantian pragmatist logic that complicates the whole set-up to 
a certain extent, namely the well-known story of how Molière died in 1673. He played 
and hence pretended to be Argan, the imaginary invalid, thus someone pretending to be 
sick. Even though he finished the performance, he afterwards collapsed and died. In 
Kantian terms one may infer: even if one just pretends to pretend, this may lead to the 
emergence of something real. What does this have to do with cinema and with the 
impossible?   
 
Effective Alienation 
It is instructive here to supplement this Kantian account of the emergence of subjective 
normative orientation with an example Bertolt Brecht brought up when he sought to 
explain the defamiliarization, alienation or estrangement effect [Verfremdungseffekt]. To 
delineate the specific operation and peculiar effectiveness of it, Brecht constructed the 
following situation: A pedestrian walks across the sidewalk, and there seems to be 
nothing remarkable about this situation per se. The defamiliarization, effect operates in 
such a way that it creates (and thus not simply emphasizes) the otherwise invisible 
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oddity of this ordinary situation. It is thereby productive: “The V-effect consists in 
turning the object of which we are made to be aware, to which our attention is to be 
drawn, from something ordinary, familiar, immediately accessible, into something 
peculiar, striking and unexpected” (Brecht 2014: 192). This effect occurs when a 
pedestrian is imitated. When an actor repeats the walk and literally mimics the 
unexciting ordinary situation, something happens. The task of the actor is to over-
emphasize and exaggerate in his imitation the characteristics of the style in which the 
pedestrian walks. Brecht claims if the actor performs the task adequately an audience 
watching the scene will start to laugh. This does not happen because the imitation is so 
amusing or because one witnesses a caricature of the individual style in which the 
pedestrian walks.2  
 Instead, this scene produces laughter through and only through the mimetic practice 
of imitation, through the redoubling of something that previously seemed ordinary and 
unremarkable. Why? Because it brings out something un-natural and artificial in the 
boringly ordinary. Repeating what is boring renders it funny. However, the alienation 
effect does not simply aim at unraveling the artificiality, even of boring everyday 
situations. Rather it produces something, something else. With the alienation effect we 
are not dealing with a simple form of mimesis. We are not encountering here a mere 
copy of reality (if anyone had ever actually believed this to be mimesis anyhow), even 
though we are obviously dealing with a mimetic practice. But the mimesis operates here 
through an exaggerated form of imitation: something appears which only comes to the 
fore because the ordinary situation is supplemented with an additional copy of itself. 
This copy makes appear what did not exist before the repetition, namely the artificiality 
that was invisible in the first place. The defamiliarization effect uses repetition 
productively: through it there is a retroactive transformation of what existed before. The 
pedestrian style will have been a different one after its imitation, namely it will appear 
as if it was already amusing prior to its imitation (which it was not). Through 
redoubling, the defamiliarization effect creates a retroactive transformation that 
generates a retroactive surplus.  
 The exaggerated mimesis produces a retroactive transformation of the past3 by 
inscribing a minimal difference, a minimal deviation into the previous situation (i.e. into 
the walking style of the pedestrian). This is not to say that this is what happens as soon 
as we have a relation between an original and a copy. The peculiar effect Brecht depicts 
rather occurs when through imitative repetition the style of the pedestrian stands to 
itself in a peculiar relation of minimal difference. The walk of the pedestrian thereby 
                                                        
2 For this cf. the writings on the “V-effect” in Brecht 2014: 184ff. 
3 Think of how, say Kafka, as was once claimed, created his own predecessors. After Kafka one sees 
something of Kafka in Dante, etc. So the emergence of any novelty is a transformation not that much of the 
future but of the past through the creation of a new present (i.e. the point of view from which the past 
taken a new guise). 
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becomes ultimately the unity of what it was before the imitation and that which it will 
have been after its imitation. It is the identity of prior identity and difference introduced 
through repetition where the minimal difference lies. Repetition, the peculiar act of 
redoubling Brecht describes, does not produce a peculiar minimal difference by adding 
new determinations or an external supplement to the style in which the pedestrian 
walks. Rather it replaces the previous determination with an immanent split, with an 
minimally deviant determination. This results “from a repetition of a practice that is 
itself no practice any more” (Menke 2013: 54; my translation) – from an empty act of a 
repetition – walking like someone else is conceptually not walking (say from A to B), but 
mimicking someone who walks. It generates something which did previously not exist, a 
minimal difference in what is. Repetition in this sense creates not only difference, but 
makes appear what was inexistent before. 
 
Remember: Remember 
Let me now turn, abruptly, to a movie. To a very strange movie, because it is one that has 
never been made: in the 1960s, Pier Paolo Pasolini planned to realize a rather unusual 
project that he was never able to carry out (at least not in the form of a film). He was 
working on a screenplay about the life of Saint Paul. The film was intended “to transpose 
the entire affair of Saint Paul to our own time” (Pasolini 2013: 17). To realize this 
project, Pasolini planned not at all to “alter the word of Saint Paul”, he rather tried “to 
summarize the entire arc of his apostolate” (2014:1). Why try and transplant Paul and 
his teaching into the contemporary world? Pasolini answers by stating that he tried “to 
present, cinematographically, in the most direct and violent fashion, the impression and 
his reality / present” (2014: 32). Alain Badiou commented on Pasolini’s project, 
remarking the latter sought “to turn Paul into a contemporary without any modification 
of his statements” (2003: 37). One is thus here dealing with an attempt of 
cinematographic repetition. The aim of this repetition was to “say then explicitly to the 
spectator, without compelling him to think that ‘Saint Paul is here, today, among us’” 
(Pasolini 2014: 32; original emphasis) – he is here with and among us, as much as for 
Hegel, in one of his famous sayings, the absolute is with us (cf. Hegel 1977: 47). 
 Badiou claimed that the aim of transplanting Paul into the contemporary world was 
linked to a threefold diagnosis: 1. For Pasolini “today the figure of the saint is necessary, 
even if the contents of the initiating encounter may vary”; 2. “by transplanting Paul, 
along with all his statements […] one sees [him and] them encountering a real society 
[…], [one] infinitely more supple and resistant than that of the Roman Empire”; and 3) 
“Paul’s statements are [thereby] endowed with a timeless legitimacy” (2003: 37) – his 
“typical language […] is universal and eternal, but not-actual […]” (Pasolini 2013: 19). 
This timeless legitimacy cannot simply emerge in a different time than Paul’s own 
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without entering into what Pasolini called a “long series of transpositions” (2014: 33). 
For him this meant that “the world in which Saint Paul lives and acts in our movie is that 
of 1966 and 1967.” This implies for example that  
the seat of modern power over the rest of the earth – is not any longer, today, 
Rome. And if it isn’t Rome, what is it? [...] New York, along with Washington 
[…].[T]he cultural, ideological, civil, in its own way religious center […] is no longer 
Jerusalem but Paris […]. And Antioch could probably be replaced, by analogy, by 
London (insofar as it is the capital of an imperial, antecedent of American 
supremacy […]). (Pasolini 2014: 33) 
 All these transpositions are necessary for a proper repetition of Paul’s initial way of 
acting (and walking) within the frame of the contemporary world. They are 
exaggerations or, at least, radicalizing transpositions needed to produce his 
contemporaneity by repeating his gesture. They are necessary additions to demonstrate 
that Paul’s conviction is still with us, without any additions. If Paul is among us, we only 
and literally see his contemporaneity when his commitment is visibly repeated in our 
world. Paul is with us, yet to make this intelligible one needs the repetition of Paul – 
Pasolini’s movie was supposed to perform this very repetition. Through this repetition – 
as with Brecht – the world as it is becomes something other than it was prior to this 
repetition: after this repetition it will have been a world in which there is the world and 
there is Paul’s untimely, contemporarily efficacious message.  
 Pasolini’s repetition of Paul thus implies an affirmation of the very possibility of 
something like a Paulinian commitment and subjective position – the belief in the 
resurrection – in a world that seems to be radically different from Paul’s and wherein 
such position seems impossible. One is here dealing with a repetition that produces a 
surplus (it adds something to the world as it is), and this surplus is produced by 
affirming something which does not appear in the world as is. This repetition is clearly 
located within the frame of the world of the 1960s in its historical specificity. But it also 
generates an index of something else within this very world. Again an act of repetition is 
productive of a minimal difference in what is, even though here in and of a different 
kind. There is the world and that which within it is supposed to be and there is that 
which does not exist within it. Through repeating Paul, Pasolini indicates that that which 
is not can nonetheless be determinately affirmed. Pasolini’s never-shot movie aimed to 
screen that which stands in a relation of exception to the contemporary world. For 
Pasolini there is only the world as it is, except that there is Paul. There is only New York, 
Washington, Paris, and London, except that there is Paul.4 Through repeating Paul’s 
gesture, the movie stages a determinate affirmation, an affirmation of the very 
possibility of an exception. An exception that, if affirmed, introduces a minimal 
                                                        
4 It is important that Pasolini with this clearly follows the imperative that “a credible progressive art […] 
must be an art of its time” (Badiou 2013a: 46). 
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difference between the world as it is, since it brings out that which seemingly does not 
exist in it. The world thus becomes the identity of the identity and difference, the unity 
of what it was prior to the act of repetition and that which it will have been afterwards. 
This affirmation of an exception through repetition also serves as a reminder. It recalls 
something, something that needs to be remembered, as it does not seem to exist 
anymore. Pasolini’s inexistent movie is thus in this sense anamnestic.  
 What does it recall? Clearly, not something that can be known. Rather it recalls 
something directly related to the conviction of Paul. It repeats, affirms and thereby 
recalls the possibility of an allegedly impossible subjective stance, an orientation beyond 
what appears to be given, an orientation that does not follow the order of the world as it 
is. Which is why it does not need to be realistic and why in the movie as scripted “Paul 
emerges strangely victorious” (Badiou 2003: 39). It might thus be said that re-
actualizing a seemingly outdated position, notably that of a religious militant, can 
indicate the forgotten, concealed impossible possibility of a subjective position for which 
there is no place within the contemporary world. Maybe it would already be enough to 
not even repeat the gesture of a religious militant, but simply depict the world as it is, 
following Brecht’s model. But here the surplus generated by repetition is a surplus that 
relates to a specific kind of remembering: a remembrance of a seemingly inexistent 
possibility of a choice, even in times when there does not seem to be any, when nothing 
grandiosely new, nothing of any universal collective value seems to be happening – and 
sometimes the first step in such direction is to take seriously that there is none (cf. Ruda 
2016). Hence Pasolini’s never-shot movie sought to recall something that cannot but 
appear impossible from a contemporary perspective. So, what Pasolini’s planned act of 
cinematographic repetition aimed at is to recall the very impossible-possibility of a 
subjective stance which opposes the given laws of the contemporary world. The 
implication of this idea is that for Pasolini any subject emerges from of an exception (for 
Paul obviously this is the Damascus experience). A subject in this sense is what emerges 
when there is a practical working on and through, a creation of a previously unforeseen 
and hence previously impossible possibility. This is why we are here not solely dealing 
with an act of remembering something that could be linked to objective knowledge. 
Rather the envisaged movie was supposed to remind the spectator of something that he 
or she never knew and hence of something that is impossible to remember. For Pasolini, 
it is essential to remember the impossible (to remember). 
 
Cinematic Education 
We are here dealing with an impossible insight, with an impossible that enters into sight. 
One would have witnessed in Pasolini’s movie something, namely the creation of the real 
disposition from within – from within the immanence of an emerging subject. Pasolini’s 
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movie sought to depict what one can usually only witness from within, from within the 
immanence of truth. To repeat Paul and his struggle with the world as it is, and to depict 
the world from the perspective of Paul, through showing his very struggle with it. This 
does not only imply the affirmation of an exception, but also that one, as spectator, 
experiences the unfolding of something that is deemed impossible – an unchanging 
commitment. From an impossible perspective – we become part of Paul’s point of view 
onto our present world –, we witness the impossible happening, an event that changes 
one’s life and the world and what follows from it (Paul’s position). This is only possible 
because of the very functioning of illusion. Hence one is here dealing with an anamnestic 
effect, reminding the spectator of the impossible possibility of a real conviction of a 
subject that had been produced by an event (Paul’s Damascus experience) and it allows 
us to see our world through the eyes of Paul: an impossible in-sight.  
 In the previously discussed models of Kant and Brecht we also encountered an 
educational or pedagogical element. Kant’s point was that education works through 
illusion, Brecht’s point was it can work through repetition. What if Pasolini’s movie-plan 
unravels something about cinema’s educational capacities, about what it can do 
pedagogically (although it, of course, does not need to do it all the time)? What if cinema 
could produce impossible reminders, reminders of the impossible, an anamnesis of 
something that exceeds knowledge? What if it can depict from an immanent perspective 
what otherwise we can only witness by becoming a subject? If this were the case, movies 
could remind their viewer of the impossible possibility of having a choice – not all the 
time, but sometimes; depicting the constitution of a new choice, when something 
happens that forces us to take a stance. And what if movies actually would depict the 
unfolding of such a procedure from within. To give a concrete example: if there were a 
good movie about love, it would make us witness from within the immanence of a 
collective love practice the act of falling in love, all the troubles and problems this 
creates, and the creation of what otherwise appears impossible, namely a sexual 
relationship.5 If cinema were to be endowed with the capacity to show us the 
transformation of the impossible into a new possibility, with all its internal 
complications, from within, cinema could de facto have an educational element as part of 
its constitution. It can be considered educational because it can make us see something 
that otherwise appears impossible by providing an impossible in-sight, by establishing a 
minimal difference that seemed inexistent before. Thereby cinema enables an insight 
into the not-all of the world as it is. What we get is a reminder, a kind of anamnesis of an 
                                                        
5 “Cinema is the only one of the arts that can claim to capture, pin down, and convey the sex act” (Badiou 
2013c: 154). Along these very lines one should also read the following statement: “You can film a miracle 
in cinema, and it may even be the case that cinema is the only art that has the potential to be miraculous” 
(Badiou 2013b: 214). Why love generates what otherwise does not exist, cf. Alain Badiou’s supplement to 
Lacan famous psychoanalytic adage that there is no relationship between the sexes (as the male and 
female position is so different that there is no neutral way of accessing their relationship). Cf. Badiou 
2008. [This is ref. Alain Badiou, “What is Love?”, in: Conditions (London/New York 2008), 179-198.] 
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impossible possibility. But why does this produce educational effects subjectively? Here 
we can return to Kant’s argument. In cinema it is clear one is dealing with an illusion. 
Cinema is fictitious and in Kant’s sense deals with permissible illusions. But even though 
we know that what we see are just illusions, they can nonetheless generate the effect 
Kant described, namely that we start to believe in them. So, if there is within the illusion 
something which is not of objective epistemological nature – recalling an impossible 
possibility – we may, although we know it is just an illusion, start to believe in it. Cinema 
can have an educational capacity because it can generate something real, a real 
disposition through its use of illusions. The real then generated is the belief that an 
exception is possible. We thereby believe in the impossible. As soon as we start to 
believe in the illusion and within the illusion there appears a minimal difference, we 
have the impossible in-sight and may fictitiously experience not what it means to 
become a subject, but that the impossible (becoming a subject) may happen. 
 Maybe from this perspective it is not entirely astonishing that after certain movies 
one feels, what appears to comes close to what Kant once described as the feeling of 
enthusiasm.6 One can recall here: enthusiasm is defined in Kant as “a straining of our 
forces by ideas that impart to the mind a momentum” (1979: 153) and as sublime, that is 
as a moment in which “the senses no longer see anything before them, while yet the 
unmistakable and indelible idea of morality remains” (1979: 151). Enthusiasm is an 
interpenetration of idea and affect – and if cinema were able to instil it in us, it would 
make us see not something else, but in a different way (which is why it is no longer 
seeing with and for the senses). It is no surprise that Kant recalls this definition when he 
talks about the spectators of the French revolution and attributes to them “a wishful 
participation that borders closely on enthusiasm […].” (1979: 151). If there is an 
educational power of the movies the enthusiasm they may create can be read as a form 
of slightly mad, wishful participation, as proto-subjectivization, in which one starts to 
truly believe in an illusion (and they certainly bring about all kinds of identificatory 
processes). Making us see differently, estranging even what seem most unalienable in 
the world as we know it, recalling the possibility of the impossible that ultimate may 
prepare us for becoming a subject – even though there is no guarantee. Badiou once 
contended that cinema is a school for everyone. One can add: a school wherein we learn 
impossible lessons, lessons of the impossible.  
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